RECENT CASES
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
In the matter of Road Rapid Transit Company, L. R. i9og,
i Chan. Div. 96, the Chancery decided that a solicitor who
holds documents of a company which has dis-

charged him, and who has paid costs in connecAttorney',
Lien for Costs tion with his work upon them, has a valid lien for

such costs.
(For a discussion of the entire subject, see note, p. 642 of
this issue.)
BILLS AND NOTES.
In an action on a check drawn to the order of a fictitious
payee, by a bona fide holder for value, held, that where an
instrument containing all the other elements of
When a Check negotiability is knowingly made payable to the
Drawn t: th! order of a fictitious person the instrument becomes negotiable without indorsement and is to
Payee
titfous
to
@sPayable
be treated as if in terms made payable to bearer.
Heir
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, See. 9,
§ 3, the plaintiff must prove that the maker knew of the
fiction. Boles v. Harding, 87 N. E. 481.
The rule at Common Law in most jurisdictions was that a
bill drawn to the order of a fictitious payee was equivalent to
a bill drawn to the order of bearer when indorsed in the name
of such payee. (Gibson v. Menot, I H. BI. 569; Hunter v.
Blodget, 2 Yeates 480) ; but it was necessary to show that the
defendant, whom it was sought to hold on the bill, was aware
of the fiction. (Bennett v. Farnell, I Camp. i3o-i8o c.) The
rule at Common Law in New York, however, was that such a
bill was payable to bearer without indorsement. (Plets v.
Johnson, 3 Hill 112; Irving Nat. Bk. v. Alley, 79 N. Y. 536.)
The English Bills of Exchange Act, Sec. 7, § 3, provides that
"when the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person, the bill
may be treated as payable to bearer." Under it knowledge
of the fiction on the part of the defendant need not be proved.
(Vagliano Bros. v. The Bank of England, L. R. 16 App.
Cases io7.) But whether the necessity of indorsement is dispensed with seems open to question. (Cf. Chalmers Bills of
Exchange, 5th ed. 22.) The Negotiable Instruments Law,
sec. 9, § 3, on the other hand, practically codifies the New
(652)
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BILLS AND NOTES (Continued).
York rule, and provides that "the instrument is payable to
bearer when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-exiLting person, and such fact was known to the person making it
so payable." Thus, under it knowledge of the fiction on the part
of the defendant is expressly required, while the general Common Law rule that an indorsement is necessary, is abolished.
Professor Ames has strongly attacked this subsection of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, and technically his criticism
seems sound inasmuch as it "permits the transfer without indorsement of an instrument, which, for all that appears on the
face of it, requires an indorsement to make a valid transfer."
(See Brannan-The Negotiable Instruments Law, io6.)
COMMON CARRIERS.
The defendant, an incorporated company, chartered to do
a general warehouse and storage business, did not confine
itself strictly to the particular business for which
WarehouseEn- it was chartered, but engaged also in the business
Company
t=
. of moving household goods. It solicited business
•ifolMovl.g of this character by public advertisements in variHousehold
Goods
ous ways, thereby holding itself out to the public
as engaged in the business of moving household
goods and inviting employment along this line. None of these
advertisements contained a suggestion of limited liability, or
that the company would render such service only as it might
select its patrons. However, the company did, in fact, claim
the right to select those whom it would serve and it had been
its custom to discriminate, accepting some and rejecting others,
as it chose. In an action to recover damages for the loss of
household goods destroyed by fire while being moved in defendant's wagon:
Held, that defendant was a common carrier and liable as
such. The Court, p. 154, said: "We express a doctrine universally sanctioned when we say, that anyone who holds himself
out to the public as ready to undertake for hire or reward
the transportation of goods from place to place, and so invites
custom of the public, is in the estimation of the law a common
carrier. * * *"
It is not decided whether there is a legal duty attaching as
a necessary incident to the relation of common carrier, under
any and all circumstances, to treat alike all applying for its services, and to avoid discrimination except upon justifying circumtsances, but the Court decided that even if there is this
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duty, defendant could not escape its liability as a common carrier on the ground that it had persistently disregarded it and
arbitrarily chosen whom it would serve.
The Court, p. 154, said: "An unavoidable implication arises
that it holds itself in readiness to engage with anyone who
might apply. Lloyd v. lloUgh, 223 Pa. 148 (1909).
This decision is in accord with the law established by earlier
cases. Verner v. Sweitzer, 32 Pa. 208 (1858). It is, however,
interesting upon its peculiar facts.
The law is settled in most of the states in accord with the
English view that no one should be treated as a common carrier unless lie has in some way held himself out to the public
as a carrier, in such manner as to render him liable to an action
if lie should refuse to carry for anyone who wished to employ
him in the particular kind of service which lie thus proposes
to undertake. See Hlutchinson "Carriers (3rd. ed.), p. 53;
But compare the
Allen v. Sackrider, 37 N. Y. 341 (1867).
opinion of Gibson, C. J., in Gordon v. Hiutchinson, I W. & S.
(Pa.) 285 (184), and also in Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 W. & S.
466, p. 468 (1844); Moss v. Bettis, 4 Heisk (Tenn.) 661

(x871).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Hammond
Packing Comnpany v. Arkansas, 29 Supreme Court Reporter,
proextraterritor 378, held constitutional a statute of Arkansas
1.1 Authority hibiting any individual, corporation, etc., from
entering into a pool or combination to regulate
Of state Over
oryoratlon
or fix prices within or without the State..
(For a full discussion of the principles involved, see note,
p. 644 of this issue.)

CONTRACTS.
A devised his lands by will to three of his sons, B, C and D,
subject to the payment by them of a legacy of $1200 to his
youngest son, E; and on the probate of the will
a decree was entered, making the legacy a specific
Accord and
satisfaction
lien on the land. B and C paid their shares in
full. D paid less than the required amount, but claimed that
the sum paid was accepted by E in full satisfaction of the
amount due. There was no release under seal, and no varia-
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tion in the mode or time of payment; and the Court held that,
under the circumstances, the debt was not discharged (Wheeley
v. Rozve, ii9 N. W. 222).
The case follows the common law rule, which has systematically held that payment of a less sum at the time and place
where a greater sum, liquidated and undisputed, was due, is
not satisfaction (Anson, Contracts, p. 16) ; this because there
is no consideration for forgiving the rest of the debt (Foakes
v. Beer, 54 L. J., Q. B. D. 130), such payment being no more
than a man is already bound to do (Pinnel's Case, 5 Coke,
117).
The rule is not universally adhered to, however. A comparatively recent case in New Hampshire has allowed payment
of a smaller sum to act as a discharge of the debt due (Frye v.
Hubbell, 68 Ati. 325) ; and Pennsylvania seems to hold that
where the circum.-tances show impending bankruptcy, the usual
ruling will not be followed (Melroy v. Kemmerer, 67 Atl. 669).
Furthermore, several jurisdictions have ablkihed the doctrine
of Foakes v. Beer by statute:
Alabama.-Code (1876), Sec. 2774;
California.-Civil Code (I844), Sec. 1524;
Maine.-Rev. St., Ch. 82, Sec. 45;
North Carolina.-Code, Sec. 574;
North Dakota.-Rev. Code, Sec. 3827;
Oregon.-Hill's Amer. Laws, Sec. 755;
South Dakota.-Comp. Laws, Sec. 3486;
Tennessee.--Code (1884), Sec. 4539;
Virginia.-Code (1897), Sec. 2858;
Mississippi abolished the rule by decisions without statutory
aid (Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 497).
CORPORATIONS.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, in State v. Standard Oil
Co., 116 S. W. 902, held that where a combination was formed
whi:ch had the power to raise or lower prices at
*orfelture of
'barter by
pleasure, this was a violation of the Anti-Trust
'legal Poolilng Act of the State, sufficient to warrant forfeiture

3f the charter of a corporation becoming a member of the

:ombine.
(For a full report of the decision, see note, p. 648 of this
.ssue.)
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CRIMINAL LAW.
In a recent case in New Jersey the facts wcre that the defendant illegally carried on the business of a private banker.
He appropriated a considerable amount of the
Larceny:
The
Intent to Pass money deposited and went to Holland.
Title
treaty with Holland allows extradition for larceny, and on question being made as to the legality of the extradition, the Court held that, "a man may be found guilty of
larceny who obtains property fraudulently, even though the
intent of the parties is to pass title, for, upon ordinary principles of law, the fraud prevents the title from passing." State v.
Deutsch, 72 Atl. 5.
The doctrine laid down by the Court in this case would do
away with all distinction between larceny and false pretence,
and is manifestly unsound. An essential element of larceny
is a trespass; and, as usually stated, the rule is that, "where the
owner intends to transfer, not the possession merely, but also
the title to the property, although induced thereto by the fiaudulent pretences of the taker, the taking and carrying away do
not constitute larceny. The title vests in the taker, and lie
cannot be guilty of larceny. Ile commits no trespass. He does
not take and carry away the goods of another, but the goods
of himself. Kellogg v. State, 26 Ohio St. 16. The contrary
view is based upon the erroneous theory that fraud per se
avoids the contract. The principle that "a contract induced by
fraud is not void, but voidable only at the option of the party
defrauded," Oakes v. Turguand, L. R. (1867) 2 H. L. 346,
is so fundamental that the error of such a theory must be at
once apparent.
Vogel v. Browvn, 87 N. E. (Mass.) 686. This case illustrates
well the distinction between the twin maxims, "Ignorantia legis
neninem excusat" and "Oinis legein scire teneOinns La
Scir. TcntUr tur." A statute in Massachusetts provides that
any person who wilfully and corruptly demands
and receives a greater fee for public services than is allowed
by law,. shall forfeit thirty dollars for each offence. Brown,
a justice of the peace, demanded and received of Vogel, for
solemnizing a marriage, a suni greater than that allowed by
law. Vogel brought an action for the forfeiture of thirty dollars. The Court held that the element of a corrupt intent must
be proved, and that upon the question whether one acts corruptly there is not a conclusive presumption that one knows the
law. Judgment was therefore given for the defendant, in the
absence of any evidence of corrupt intent, or of defendant's
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knowledge of the statutory fee. The principle that ignorance
of the law excuses no one could have had no application here,
in the face of a statute expressly requiring a corrupt intent;
but the strict application of the proposition that everyone is
presumed to know the law would have involved finding the
defendant guilty. Ignorance of the law, it is true, excuses no
one from the natural results of his acts-%vhether those acts
involve a crime, a contract, or a tort; but since it is often necessary to find that a man had a specific intention or state of
mind before he can be charged with his acts, it is evident that
the maxim "Onunis legemn scirc tenetur" must, if it be universally applicable, be purely arbitrary. The better view seems to
be that a man's knowledge of the law is a question of fact,
just as his knowledge of statistics or geography, and that the
law will indulge in no absurd presumptions that a man knows
what, as a matter of fact, he could not reasonably know. Thus
in Martindale v. Falkner, 2 C. B. 719, Maule, J., scouted the
idea that a layman should be presumed to know that a "decree" is entered in Chancery and not in the Common Law
Courts; and in Regina v. Tcwkesbury, 3 Q. B. 635, Blackburn,
J., held that electors who knew a candidate to be mayor of
the tox n could not be presumed to know that he was not a
qualified candidate on that account. Lord Mansfield said, "It
would be very hard upon the profession if the law were so certain that everybody knew it; the misfortune is that it is so uncertain that it costs much money to know what it is, even in the
last resort." Jones v. Randall, Cowp. 38.

EVIDENCE.
In an action of ejectment the plaintiff rested its right to
recover on a purchase agreement executed December 18, 19oo.
The defendant objected that such agreement was
not admissible because it was not stamped in acUnstamped
Document Ad-

cordance with the requirements of the act of.Congress of June 13, 1898.
Held, the act of Congress of June 13, 1898, was
repealed by tke act of April 12, 1902, "without reservation of

missible after
Repeal of th3
Stamp Act

right thereafter to demand the tax in cases where the stamp had

been omitted from instruments executed during the perfod
the act was operative, or enforce any of the penalties or forfeitures which the act provided should follow a disregard bf
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its provision-," and therefore the docnmenit was admissible.
Ohio River Junction R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 222 Pa.,
573For a discussion of the principle involved in this case see
Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, § 478.
FRAUD.
In an action for deceit in the sale by defendants to the
plaintiff of the stock of a corporation there was evidence that
c
the plaintiff in buying the stock relied upon cerFal°
setitstloas
tain false statements miae by the defendants, with
Insc
whom the plaintiff had long been on terms of
friendship, as to the assets, liabilities, and property of the company, and that the stock was of the less value
than if the representations had been true. It appeared further
that plaintiff had visited the corporation's store, and had been
given an opportunity to observe the stock in trade and to
examine the books of the corporation; that said books were
double-entry, voluminous, and highly artificial; that the plaintiff was given no assistance in examining them, but was in one
instance interrupted continually by the defendants while so
engaged. Plaintiff was non-suited.
Held, that courts will refuse to act for the relief of one
claiming to have been misled 1 another's statements, who
blindly acts in disregard of knowledge of their falsity or with
such opportunity that by the exercise of ordinary observation,
not necessarily by search, he would have known. He may
not close his eyes as to what is obviously discoverable by him.
It is in this sense only that opportunity to know the truth will
prevent recovery for deceit. Whether the opportunity is present in any case is usually a question of fact, depending, inter
alia, upon his intelligence or acuteness and the confidence reposed by him in the other by reason of acquaintance or confidence. This case should have been left to the jury. Jacobsen v. Whitel3,, 120 N. \V. 285 (Wis., 19o9).
The effectiveness of deceit is to be tested by its actual influence on the person deceived, not by its probable weight with
another. Bowe v. Gaqe, 127 \Wi.. 245 (i9o6).
The situation of the parties and the intelligence of the defrauded party must also be considered by the jury in determining if the purchaser was actually deceived. Kendall v.
Wilson. 41 Vt. 509 (i869) ; (Sale of perpetual motion machine,
etc.) ; Barnet v. Frederick, 78 Wis. i (i8qo); (Sale of mining
stock). See also Stones v. Richmond, 21 'Mo. App. 17 (1886).
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HOMICIDE.
Where two conspire to commit an assault, and in the execution thereof the victim is killed, the conspirator who did not
do the killing is guilty of manslaughter. State v.
Liablitof

Consplrators

issue.

Darling, I 5 S. W. loo2 (Missouri).
(For further particulars see note p. 635 of this

LIBEL.

In a recent case in Georgia the defendant had in a previous
action taken an affidavit "that he would not believe the said
Buschbaum upon oath." Under the circumstances
this was held equivalent to testimony in open court,
and,.in an action brought against him for libel, the
words being material were held to be privileged. The court,
however, went further, ant in a dictum held that a witness is
absolutely privileged, except when he volunteers immaterial
testimony. Buschbaumn v. Heriot, 63 S. E. 645.
The dictum in this case indicates that Georgia is in line
with England and the jurisdictions of this country-among
them Maryland, Indiana, Texas, and Vashington-which hold
that the privilege of a witness is absolute. The justification
of this rule is that the witness "is compelled to speak, with
ao right to decide what is material or what is immaterial; and
he should not be subject to the possibility of an action for his
vords."
(Townshend Slander and Libel, 4 th ed., § 223.)
-n the other hand, many American jurisdictions, among which
ire Massachusetts, New York, Maine, Iowa, and West Vir,inia, hold that public policy requires that a witness should be
ibsolutely privileged only where the defamatory words are relecant to the matter in issue. Under this view, "whether matter
.s pertinent is a question for the court, and, in determining the
luestion, no strained, technical, or close construction will be
indulged in to deprive the defendant of the protection of privilege." (Cooley Torts, 3 d ed., I 433.) A dictum in a recent
Pennsylvania case favors this view. (Kemper v. Fort,219 Pa.
85, 19o7), but the English doctrine seems better, for "the due
administration of justice requires that a witness should speak,
according to his belief the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, without regard to the consequences, and he
should be encouraged to do this by the consciousness that, except for any willfully false statement, which is perjury, no
matter that his testimony may be in fact untrue, or that loss
to another ensues by reason of his testimony, no action for
slander can be maintained against him." (Townshend Slander
Privilege of

Witnesses

and Libel, 339.)
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LIMITATION OF ACTION.
Martin v. White, ioo Pac. 293 (Ore.). Land was sold the
defendant under a tax deed valid on its face, though in fact
Title .Through

void because of an unlawful assessment.
tu

The

true owner, who had never given up possession of the land, brought a bill to remove
the cloud on his title. The statute provides that no
such action shall be brought unless within two years from the
date of record of the deed from the Sheriff. It was held that
the action lay here, although more than two years had elapsed
since the sale, and this because the purchaser at Sheriff's sale
had never had possession of the land. The Court held that
where a deed is void it is beyond the power of the Legislature to transfer title by mere lapse of time, and that the purchaser at Sheriff's sale must take possession before the statute
can begin to run. Since the owner has both title and possession, the Legislature exceeds its power when it attempts to
create the necessity for suit by converting an estate in possession into a mere right of action, and then limiting the time in
which the action may be brought. In Pennsylvania, through a
difference of statutes, a different conclusion has been reached.
The Act of Apr. 3, 18o4, provided that no action should lie
for the recovery of land by the owner, unless brought within
five years of the tax sale. But this was early held inapplicable
where the owner had actual possession during the five years;
Tax Sale

Bigler v. Karns, 4 W. & S. 137.

The Act of March 29, 1824,

provided that the owner might bring ejectment against the
purchaser at the tax sale, though the latter were not in possession of the land. Since, therefore, the right of legally asserting his title accrued to the owner upon the delivery of the
tax deed to the purchaser, it is "perfectly fair to launch the
statute from the time he bad such opportunity ;" Robb v. Bowen,
9 Ban. 71. This means that in Pennsylvania a purchaser at
Sheriff's sale may acquire a good title by the mere lapse of
five years, provided the tax deed were good on its face and- the
owner were not in possession during the five years.
NEGLIGENCE.
In a recent case in 'Michigan the plaintiff was injured while
a passenger on the defendant's logging road. Held, "If the
Care Required rule of law as to care to be exercised by common
of Common
carriers were inflexible, and such logging roads
Carriers
were to be required to furnish the same tracks,
train, and equipment generally as are commercial roads, the

RECENT CASES

NEGLIGENCE (Continued).
result would be the judicial prohibition of enterprises of their
nature. All that is required of such roads is the exercise of
the highest care under the circumstances. Campbell v. Duluth
& Northeastern R. R., 120 N. W. 375.
This case raises again the interesting question of the degree
of care required of common carriers. The rule laid down in
England is that "a railway company is bound to use the best
precautions in known practical use to secure the safety of their
passengers" (Ford v. L. & S. W. Ry., 2 F. & F. 730), and the
same rule has been adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in the words, "extraordinary vigilance aided by the
highest skill (Pa. Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451), while in New
York the test laid down is the utmost care and diligence which
human prudence and foresight will suggest to secure the
safety of its passengers." Paler v. D. & H. Canal Co., 120
N. Y. I7O.

On the other hand, the rule in the majority of United States
jurisdictions (noticeably so in the South and West) is such
skill, diligence and foresight as is exercised by a very cautious
person under like circumstances" (Furnish v. Ry. Co., 102 Mo.
438), which is but another phraseology of the test adopted in
the case under discussion. The cause of the divergence of
jurisdictions as to this test of negligence is to be found mainly
in the wide difference in economic conditions in the localites
where the several rules have been adopted. While a State is in
a process of rapid development it is necessary to encourage
the building of railroads as much as possible, and it is obvious
that if the highest degree of equipment were immediately required of such roads, "the effect would indeed be the judicial
prohibition of enterprises of their nature;" and the courts, as
was said in a North Carolina case, "are not disposed to check
the process of evolution from a lumber road into a comfortable
line for passengers as the development of business justifies
the change." Hansley v. R. R., 115 N. C. 6o2. On the other
hand, in England and in some of our Eastern States, such a
degree of economic development has been reached that it is
more important to discourage the insufficient equipment of railroads now in existence than it is to encourage the building of
new lines, and hence "the best precautions in known practical
use" are required.

RECENT CASES

NEGLIGENCE (Continued).
An electric light comnpany, which allows its wires to run
through trees into which children are likely to climb, is bound
to keep theln insulated. and is liable for injury to
Nec-,srr
a child coming in contact with an exposed portion
Care of an.
A! ullen v. J1ilkes-Barrc Gas and Electric
gerousAgency of it.
Co., 38 Pa. Superior, 3.
(For a full discussion see note p. 639 of this issue.)
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
Jones, for the accommodation of Ierman, made his promissory note, payable two years after date, to the order of Herman. Hlerman, after the maturity of the note,
Accommodsindorsed it to plaintiff's assignor as collateral setion
P~aper"
curity for a note then executed by Herman to
Negotiated
for Value After
plaintiffs assignor. The note was assigned to
Maturity
plaintiff after maturity and presumably for value,
although the case is not clear as to the latter point. Held:
"It is a question upon which the precedents are at some variance, whether or not the agency of the party accommodated
to use the accommodation paper to raise money thereon (no
express agreement appearing) expires with the maturity of the
paper. * * * The courts of this State are not yet committed upon the question presented, and it seems more in barmony with the uniform negotiable instrument law, and with
the weight of judicial authority, to hold, as we do, that the
mere fact that the accommodation note was transferred by the
party accommodated after due to a holder for value does not
permit the accommodation maker to defeat recovery at the suit
of the holder for value merely upon the ground that the note
was an accommodation note, and without consideration moving to the accommodation maker." Afarling v. Jones, i19 N.
W. 031 (Wi-., 1909).

Before the act the decisions in America upon this point were
conflicting. In accord with Charles v. Marsden, i Taunton, 224
(i8o8), and the principal case. see Bank v. Grant, 71 Me. 374
( i88o) ; (ictum of Beasley, C. J., in Seyfert v. Edison, 45 N. J.
L. 393 (1883); Conncrly & Co. v. Ins. Co., 66 Ala. 432
(igSo) ; contra, Chester v. Dorr, 4T N. Y. 279 (iS69) ; Peale
v. Addicks, 174 Pa. q49 (1896) ; Cottrell v. Watkins, et al., 89
Va. SOT (1893) ; in Wisconsin not decided. Black v. Tarbell,
89 Wis. 390, p. 393 (i8q ).
The principal case must be distinguished from those where
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a recovery was allowed against the accommodation party, there
being an intermedciate bona fidc holder for value before maturity, as in Duniz v. IVcston, 71 Me. 270 (i88o). For the rule
of law upon this state of facts see i Daniel "Negot Instr.," Sec.
786; also N. I. L., Sect. 58, par. 2. Wis. St. Suppl., 1676-28.
See Mcrsick v. Alderman, 77 Conn. 634 (905).
The English Bills of Exchange Act has apparently codified
the English law as established by Charlcs v. Marsden, supra.
Byles "Bills," pp. 196, 197, footnote (x).
Sect. 58, par. x, N. I. L. provides: "In the hands of any
holder other than a holder in due course, a negotiable instrument is subject to the same defences as if it were non-negotiable." i. Wis. Suppl., 1676-28. This would seem in effect
equivalent to Section 36, par. 2, Eng. B. E. A. One of the
essential requisites of a holder in due course is that he became
a holder before the instrument was overdue. N. I. L., Sect. 52;
Wis. St. Suppl., 1676-22. Eng. B. E. A., Sect. 29, par. i (a).
Absence of consideration is not enumerated as making defective the title of one who negotiates an instrmnient. N. I. L.,
Sect. 55; Wis. St. Suppl., 1676-25; Eng. B. E. A., Sect. 29,
par. 2.

N. I. L., Sect. 29 (Wis. St. Suppl., 1675-55), provides: "An
accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as
maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value
therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some
other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a
holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of
taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation
party." This is substantially Sect. 28, Eng. B. E. A.
Thus far the Negot. Instr. Law has consistently followed the
English act in adopting the doctrine of Charles v. Marsden,
supra. But it is difficult to reconcile this doctrine with Sect.
28 N. I. L. (Wis. St. Suppl., 1675-54) ; not in Eng. B. E. A.
This section provides: "Absence or failure of consideration is
matter of defence as against any person not a holder in due
course; * * *." A holder in due course must take the bill
before it is overdue" (see supra).
The effect of the decision is to hold that under Secs. 28 and
29 of the act, a negotiable instrument given for the payee's accommodation may be transferred by him after maturity for
value and subsequently transferred for value to the plaintiff,
so as to confer on him a title against the accommodating maker.
Though this accords with the previously existing law of
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certain States, it is a direct overthrow of a principle firmly established in many others.
It is instructive to note that in all the controversy as to the
meaning of the Act no one has anticipated such an interpretation as that given by the principal case. But the power of codification is not always accompanied by the power of accurate
prediction of the future interpretation of the code.
Section 29 of the Negotiable Instrument Law is a reproduction substantially of the English Bills of Exchange Act, 45
& 46 Vict., Ch. 6r, Sec. 28, and standing alone leads to the
conclusion of Charles v. Marsden.
Section 28 of the Negotiable Instrument Law is a new section drawn by the American codifiers, and standing alone leads
to the conclusion of Chester v. Dorr. When the two sections
are put together they present apparently logical contradictories,
because Sec. 28 declares that absence of consideration is matter
of defence against one who purchases after maturity, and
Sec. 29 declares that an accommodation party is liable to a
holder for value. The Wisconsin Court accepted the latter
horn of the dilemma and held Sec. 28 to be meaningless, as
applied to accommodation paper. Perhaps we shall hereafter
see the two sections construed by some other Court so as to
give effect to both sections by construing "holder for value"
in Section 29 to mean, holder for value before maturity.
The English Code doctrine is supposed to go even to the
length of holding "that an original absence of consideration in
the case of an accommodation bill is not one of those equities
which attach on the instrument and defeat the title of an
indorsee for value of an overdue bill, although zcith notice of
the fact." Byles on Bills, I6th English Edition, p. 196,
note (x).
Is this now the law under the American Negotiable Instruments Act? Possibly some Courts will recoil from keeping a
liability over the head of an accommodating party for six years
after the maturity of the loan of his credit even where the
purchaser has knowledge of the circumstance.
Assumpsit on two promissory notes executed by defendants,
as co-partners, and eighteen others, to one Crawford, as part
and by him assigned to
what consti purchase price of a horse,
plaintiff for value, indorsed by Crawford "Paytute* Notice
ment guaranteed." Defendants claimed that the
note- was procured by Crawford's agent with the understanding
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that each of the signers could release himself of liability by
paying $ioo; that one of the defendants paid $Ioo beforie the
note left his office, and thereupon by agreement endorsed the
notes as paid in full by defendants; that subsequently this endorsement was altered without the consent of the aforesaid
partner for the purpose of enabling Crawford to negotiate the
note, the endorsement as altered not showing payment in full
by defendants. Plaintiff, by his agent, bought the notes, with
notice of the erasure and of the writing over it.
tfeld, that the controlling question in the case was whether
the notes as they appeared to the plaintiff's agent required investigation, and made it a matter of bad faith to buy without
it." It is not sufficient that the circumstances ought to excite
the suspicion of a prudent, careful person. "Such circumstances of suspicion or even gross negligence are merely admissable as evidence tending to show bad faith, but do not of
themselves preclude the holder from recovery." Custard v.
Hodges, 119 N. W. 583 (Mich., i9O9).

This case is apparently covered by the Negotiable Instruments law (Mich. Pub. Acts, 1905, P. 389, sect. 58, p. 398),
which in this respect corresponds to the Negotiable Instruments Law of Pa. (Sect. 56) N. Y. (Sect. 95) and Mass.
(sect. 56).
In accord with the principal case see. Bank v. Union Trust
Co., 145 Mich. 656 (19o6); Bank v. Weston, 172 N. Y. 259
(19O2); Tillebrown v. Hayward, i9o Mass. 472 (19o6). Compare, however, Pelton v. Sawmill & Lumber Co., 112 N. W. 29,
Wis. i9o7 .
In this respect the act has been decided to be a codification
of common law, prior to its passage. Tillebrown v. Hayward
(supra).
A purchaser who wilfully closes his ears to information, or
refuses to make inquiry when circumstances of grave suspicion demand it is not protected by any rule of law. Lytle v.
Lansing, 147 W. S.59, P. 71 (1893). See also 7 Cyc. 945.
RAILROADS.
A railway company, being authorized to carry their railway
across a highway on the level, constructed the railway at a
slightly higher level than the road, and, in order
Duty
to
up to the level of the railway,
MnIantaltu
Ap- to bring the road u
pr chCs to
raised it by means of inclined plane-, on either
Crosr~ng

side of the railway, under powers conferred by

their special act. The act was silent as to any
obligation of the company to repair the roadway upon the
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inclined planes. Plaintiffs are the highway authority responsible for the repair of the main roads in the county of Hertfordshire. Held, that there was imposed upon the company
by the common law, as a condithm of the statutory authority
to interfere with the highway an obligation to keep in repair
the roadway upon the whole of the inclined planes, including
those portions which lay outside the fences of the railway.
Ilertfordshire County Council v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., i
K. B. (x9o9), Part III, p. 368.
In Roxbury v. Railroad Co., 6o Vt. 121 (1887), p. 138,
Feazey, J., said:
"It is plain that the company's duty (lid not end at the line of
its land, if the highway could not be made good and sufficient
without extending the fill of the crossing further. A crossing
that could not be used in ordinary travel on the highway without the embankment or fill constituting the approaches being
extended beyond the railroad land, would not be, without such
extension, such a crossing as the law required. With such a
defective crossing the highway would not be restored to its
former state and usefulness. It would not be good and sufficient."
Where a railroad crosses a public road already in use, the
railroad company and its successors must, if not relieved by
statute, not only restore the public road, but erect and maintain perpetually all structures and keep up all repairs made
necessary by such crossing for the safety and convenience of
public travel. Dyer County v. R. R., 87 Penn. 712 (1889). See
also Roe v. Elneudorf, 52 EIow. Pr. Rep. 232 (Sup. Ct, 1876) ;
Pa. R. R. Co. v. Borough of Irwin, 85 Pa. 336 (1877); approaches to bridge over crossing, Hayes v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.
R. Co., 9 Hun, 63 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1877). But see contra M.
K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Long, 27 Kan. 684 (1882); P. Ft. TV. & C.
R. Co. v. Maurer, 21 Ohio St. 421 (1871). Compare Brookins
v. Central R. & Banking Co., 48 Ga. 523 (1873)-

